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Abstract:
Corruption at all levels has become an everyday reality in South Africa and Brazil 
with dire consequences for both countries, leading to perpetration of social in-
equality. In both countries, the existing legislation and anti-corruption agencies 
have been unable to curb the phenomenon efficiently. One of the key reasons 
for this failure has been the modus operandi of the anti-corruption agencies, 
which throughout the years have faced serious changes (political, legal, admin-
istrative and organisational) in their fight against a multi-facet, complicated, and 
multi-layered reality. In both countries, the state bureaucracy apparatus, has over 
the years, faced both grand and petty corruption in both the public and private 
sector domains, whereby the competition for irregular thirst for wealth accu-
mulation has reached unprecedented levels. The anti-corruption agencies then 
have to deal with a multiplicity of corruption diversions and dimensions in their 
efforts to detect, dissect, investigate and prosecute. There are a number of dif-
ferences in the legislative frameworks determining the structure, functions and 
operations of such organisations in these countries. This article, based on an em-
pirical paradigm rooted on interpretative qualitative methodology, will analyse 
and dissect the similarities, differences, achievements, failures and challenges in 
terms of mandates, efficiency efficacy, and resources allocation. This comparison 
will be located within the ‘multiple versus single agency’ debate.
Key words:  Corruption; multi or single anti-corruption agencies; effectiveness; 
South Africa; Brazil
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AbbREvIATIONS
●● ACTT (Anti-Corruption Task Team)
●● AFU (Asset Forfeiture Unit)
●● AGSA (Auditor General of South Africa)
●● CGU (Office of the Comptroller General)
●● CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau)
●● DPCD (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations)
●● DPF (Federal Police Department)
●● DPSA (Department of Public Service and Administration)
●● DSO (Directorate of Special Operations)
●● IPAC (Independent Commission against Corruption)
●● IPID (Independent Police Investigations Directorate)
●● JCPS (Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster)
●● MAWG  (Multi-Agency Working Group on Supply Chain Management and 
Procurement)
●● MPF (Public Prosecutor’s Office)
●● NPA (Nation Prosecuting Authority)
●● OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
●● PRASA (Passenger Rail Association of South Africa)
●● PSC (Public Service Commission)
●● SACU (Special Anti-Corruption Unit)
●● SAPS (South African Police Services)
●● SIU (Special Investigations Unit)
●● TCU (National Court of Accounts)
●● The HAWKS (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation)
●● UNCAC (United Nations Convention against Corruption)
INTRODUCTION
The key question underlying the article is based on the comparative analysis of the 
realities surrounding the single anti-corruption agency in Brazil, with the multiple 
anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. The stepping stone upon which the article 
is based, is that in both cases, and despite the agencies’ efforts, corruption is still 
flourishing in both countries in all spheres of society, hence the comparison will 
dissect the differences between the effectiveness or not, of a multiple or single 
agency, and in so doing explore the underlying issues. Operational, functional 
and systemic weakness, strengths and challenges are key in the successful fight 
against corruption.
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THE DILEMMA: SINGLE OR MULTIPLE AGENCY?
International debate on the issue of multiple or single anti-corruption agency never 
ceases, mostly because corruption has reached new high levels of sophistication de-
manding greater effectiveness and efficiency in order to combat unethical behaviour 
by both public servants and the private sector operators. The reality is that ‘ready so-
lutions’ and ‘widely accepted/successful models’ of anti-corruption approaches are 
not helpful anymore. A comprehensive analysis and understanding of the historical 
foundations, and a dissection of the specificities of the social, economic, techno-
logical, cultural and institutional context, are key in the final selection in terms of 
planning, implementing and operationalising new agencies (De Sousa 2009:3–4). 
This axiom has become more than evident in the relevant research report exam-
ining such agencies in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Doig and 
Williams 2008:3–4).
The Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development (OECD) as well as 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) have proposed that 
there is a need for such institutions to operate in accordance to articles 6 and 36 
of the Convention, in short as Prevention Agencies; Law Enforcement Agencies; or 
Category 3 Combined (Prevention and Law Enforcement Agencies; OECD 2007). 
Heilbrunn (2004) contributes to this understanding by classifying the agencies four 
models: the Universal Model, Investigative Model, Parliamentary Model and the 
Multi-Agency Model. The Universal Model agencies have produced the widely ac-
knowledged, most effective institution of its kind, the Hong-Kong s´ Independent 
Commission against Corruption (ICAC) that was instrumental in stopping corruption, 
based on a solid legal and regulatory framework and almost sweeping powers to oper-
ate (Klitgaard 1998:108–110).
The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), established in Singapore, is con-
sidered the epitome of an Investigative Model operating since the early 1950s that 
was strengthened by the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act of Singapore 
in 1960 in order to empower its investigating capacities and enhance its community-
based educational initiatives (CIPB 2017). The multi-agency model is based on the 
existence of a number of components that have well-defined functions and systems 
and based on exchange of information, coordination and cooperation at all levels and 
is devoid of political interferences.
The lack of a centralised anti-corruption agency to coordinate the fight against corrup-
tion, has been described as a key weakness given the multi-layered corruption realities 
that demand a multiplicity of factors such as abundance of resources, high degrees 
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of knowledge, sophistication in detection, analysis, universal support, and a strong, 
well-organised and cooperative judiciary. These are prerequisites for success for this 
model (Meagher 2005).
Irrespective of the type of anti-corruption agencies operating, there are some widely 
accepted characteristics that are key in their success such as strong political will and 
unquestionable support at the highest political level; political and operational inde-
pendence to investigate the corrupt; adequate legislative powers of access to relevant 
documentation and to question witnesses; fair, ethical, honest, transparent and ac-
countable leadership which enjoys the trust and confidence of the citizens; clear re-
porting hierarchy (Klitgaard 1988:98–99; Heilbrunn 2006; De Sousa 2008); sufficient, 
skilful, knowledgeable, staff and sufficient resources; special legislative powers; high 
levels of coordination, cooperation and information sharing with other anti-corruption 
agencies (Kpundeh 2005:123–124; OECD 2005:4–5); preventive and educational 
components, and the ability to investigate, detect, examine and analyse information 
that lead to prosecutions of the corrupt (OECD 2007:11–12).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL
The South African model is based on a rich and diversified laws, rules and regulations 
that have created a comprehensive anti-corruption group of agencies, and constitu-
tionally-based institutions with similar and occasionally different priorities. Thus the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) undertakes criminal proceedings on behalf of 
the state; the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) freezes and seizes proceeds of crime; IPID 
( the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) functions as an investigator 
on corruption and maladministration in the South African Police Service; SIU (the 
Special Investigating Unit (SIU) investigates corruption at all levels and recovers losses 
through legal initiatives; SAPS (the South African Police Service) investigates all forms 
of corruption, and finally, the DPCI (the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations), 
whose role is detect, investigate and combat offences that have been described as 
‘national priority’.
This multiplicity of agencies are supplemented by the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) which assesses, monitors and evaluates state policies, practices, compliance, 
and control as well as the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; the office of the 
Public Protector whose role is to investigate and report to the state institutions corrupt 
activities in all spheres of society, and the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
who is in charge of researching and reporting compliance through performance and 
forensic audits of all state-funded entities.
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The National Treasury, the South African Receiver of Revenue and the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC) which investigates proceeds of corrupt actions, including money 
laundering, are key in the state anti-corruption fight (Woods and Mantzaris 2012). This 
Daedalus-like anti-corruption group is ‘coordinated by ACTT (the Anti-Corruption Task 
Team dealing with ‘high priority corruption’) and MAWG (the Multi-Agency Working 
Group on Supply Chain Management dealing with corrupt practices related to Supply 
Chain Management and procurement). It can be understood that such a multiplicity of 
agencies demands the prioritisation of cooperation, co-ordination, monitoring and as-
sessment for success (OECD 2008:12). Above all the technicalities, the key issue lead-
ing to the success of anti-corruption efforts is strong political will that is expressed not 
only by committed support, but also through the provision of sufficient resources, moral 
behaviour across all organisational units, transparency and integrity in human resources 
selections, and most importantly, integrity at levels of the political trajectory.
The disbandment of the Scorpions following President Zuma’s elevation to power has 
led to a debate coupled with protracted court cases that reached the Constitutional 
Court demanding an ‘independent anti-corruption entity’ emulating the Scorpions 
(Glenister 2011). In South Africa, as exemplified in the National Development Plan 
(NPC 2011:401), the belief is that a single agency is inadequate in fighting corruption 
because of the fear of political capture and loss of independence, while the multi-
ple agency system is more operational because it does not face interference due to 
existing checks and balances. There has been criticism, however, that the Plan has 
avoided participation or dialogue with civil society, key stakeholders and role players 
in the process of drafting the new policy document (Manion 2004:40). The National 
Development Plan openly admitted that the country is facing high levels of corruption 
that undermine the rule of law and stall development and that ”the performance of 
state systems of accountability has been uneven enabling corruption to thrive” (NPC 
2011:402). These findings confirmed reports of the Public Service Commission in 
2011, that the mandates of the anti-corruption agencies overlap, and had become inef-
fective, resulting in the need for central coordination in order to increase effectiveness 
(Public Service Commission 2011:3–4). The report further proposed new corruption 
classifications that included mismanagement of government funds, procurement and 
appointment irregularities, housing fraud, abuse of government resources, mismanage-
ment of government funds, unethical and criminal behaviour, as well as housing and 
social grant fraud (PSC 2011:14–15). It is important to note here that the highly diversi-
fied classification of corruption has been a common challenge for a large number of 
countries (Gathii 2009:25–27; EACC 2010; OECD 2012).
Following the PSC classification, the Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) ‘re-classified’ corruption manifestations that included abuse of power, nepotism, 
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extortion, favouritism, embezzlement, abuse of privileged information, fraud, conflict of 
interest, insider trading and bribery (DPSA 2002:12). In can be understood then that the 
‘very specific mandates’ of agencies developed problems related to the broadness of 
their mandate as opposed to the above classifications. This reality can be epitomised by 
the case of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) whose mandate is so wide that it overlaps 
not only with that of other agencies but also with that of both the Asset Forfeiture Unit 
and the Public Protector (Stevenson 2011:12). Such problems are exacerbated by lack of 
synergy, coordination and cooperation amongst the agencies.
In such a situation, then, the belief that each agency is unique in its planning and 
implementation of mandates is but a hallucination because of the confusing overlaps 
in their operations (PSC 2011:21). This because the existing co-ordination mechanisms 
have been of limited use in both systems, functions and operations (PSC 2011:23). The 
chronic political interference in the leadership, operations, planning and implementa-
tion of the designated duties is a harsh reality especially in terms of ‘national priority 
crimes’ and is reminiscent of the case of the ‘Scorpions’, the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO), a highly respected unit that supplemented the anti-corruption 
operations of existing anti-corruption agencies (News24 2008:4; Redpath 2009). The 
history of the Scorpions is instrumental in the success against corruption as it com-
bined all aspects of detection, analysis and prosecutions through its multi-dimensional 
operations (Montesh 2007), with a 95% successful prosecution rate (Redbath 2004:12; 
NPA 2005). It was one of the key victims of political interference due to their successes 
in high-profile political cases, involving the present President of the country who was 
not charged (Kanyegirire 2008).
The organisation’s death warrant was signed and sealed in the ruling party’s elective 
conference in Polokwane, where an overwhelming majority of the delegates voted for 
its immediate disbandment (ANC 2007). They were replaced by the Hawks, that since 
1998 has been torn by political interference, factionalism, unstable leadership, illegal 
promotions and appointments, arbitrary actions and promotions all covered by senior 
politicians (Bateman & Grootes 2015).
Section 181 of the Constitution (RSA 1996) states clearly that anti-corruption agen-
cies ought to be subject only to the supreme law of the country and the country’s 
legal system; they should be independent and impartial and exercise their powers and 
perform their duties and responsibilities without fear, favour or prejudice; all other 
state organs must protect and assist them in ensuring their integrity, dignity, effective-
ness, impartiality and the effectiveness of such institutions through legislative and 
regulatory measures; that no person or state organ interferes with the operations and 
functions of the agencies, and that the National Assembly alone is the judge of their 
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accountability to the citizens and the performance of these institutions at least once 
per year. Irrespective of the existing structural and operational realities as well as the 
refinement of legislative guidelines, there have been serious problems in relation to 
attempts in streamlining the realities of policy and implementation of duplications of 
actions as well as tactics and strategies. These are an impediment to success and pose 
serious questions to the effectiveness and efficiency of the agencies.
This is despite the existence of numerous ‘co-ordination mechanisms’ epitomised in the 
MACC (Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements conundrum and its compli-
ance requirements, including the Special Anti-Corruption Unit (SACU, RSA 2010:13–
14; PSC 2011:17–18). Things became even more complicated with the establishment of 
Multi-Agency Working Group (MAWG) dealing with corruption in procurement. The 
Justice Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster whose objective is to set up task 
teams to fast-track investigations and prosecution and the Anti-Corruption Task Team 
(ACTT, RSA 2015). The case of the Hawks and its modus operandi is the most crystal 
clear negation of most of the characteristics of a successful anti-corruption agency 
model. Their decisions are not impartial or independent, as they are dictated by gov-
ernment politicians and operate under continuous political asphyxia. This is despite 
the part nullification of section 17D (1) of the South African Police Services Act which 
was believed as an agency to be at the mercy of the Minister of Police. This means that 
it is not the Minister of Police but the National Head of the Hawks, who is entitled to 
make the key decisions for investigations.
However, the most important aspect is the almost complete capture of the Hawks by 
the political establishment and the choice of leadership that followed the unceremoni-
ous exit of then Head in 2015, a leader who is known to resist political interference, 
and his replacement by Major General M B Ntlemeza. The Major General was de-
scribed by a Pretoria High Court Judge as a person devoid of “integrity and honour”. 
Hence, the Head of an important anti-corruption agency has been found by a court 
of law to be dishonest and dishonourable, but is chosen by the political leadership to 
be appointed to a position obligating him to act honestly, accountably, impartially and 
without fear against corrupt politicians and in politically-dominated cases (De Voss 
2016). Such leaders are the most vulnerable to political capture.
The same situation was faced by the South African Police Services after the appoint-
ment of Lieutenant-General K Phahlane as acting National Commissioner in 2015. 
Before his appointment there was evidence against him related to plundering of secret 
funds, and illegal appointments in crime intelligence of more than 250 individuals (15 
of them allegedly with criminal records). He was instrumental as a key player within 
the criminal justice system together with the NPA and the Hawks in a steady refusal 
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to investigate the evident corruption of key, bankrupt parastatals such as the South 
African Airways, the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), Escom, and 
Transnet (Thamm 2017).
THE bRAZIL MODEL
Brazil has adopted the multi-agency model, which, in truth, is almost as complicated 
as the South African one.
In the last three decades following the collapse of the military junta that ruled the coun-
try for many years, there have been considerable efforts to fight corruption at all levels 
and sectors of society (Business Anti-corruption Portal n.d). The adoption of the Federal 
Constitution paved the way for democratic reforms such as the rule of law, democratic 
freedoms, free press, civil liberties and protection of human rights, but they were not, as 
expected, to elevate the poorest and more vulnerable out of the clutches of inequality 
(International Law Enforcement Reporter 2011:1). This is despite the overtly publicised 
efforts of successive Ignacio Lula’s governments that faced a well-known, historical, tra-
ditional, past and present multi-layered and perpetual enemy which they unfortunately 
embraced themselves as much as their predecessors: corruption (Levine, Yannett, de 
Almeida, Muzzi., Steven, and Frischtak 2013:12). Thus, the population, including the 
poor, the very poor and the middle classes witnessed, especially during those years, a 
state apparatus in ‘full swing’, according to the governmental propagandists, the resil-
ience of the free, watchful media, or at least a section of it that began campaigns expos-
ing a wide variety of combinations of grand, petty, and/or administrative corruption 
involving bribes, collusions, nepotism, buying and selling favours, sell out congressmen 
and government officials, an ex-President with a jail sentence, another one impeached 
and the incumbent under serious investigation for corruption. All this was aired in na-
tional broadcasts (The Economist 2015).
Brazil has introduced over the years anti-corruption legislation that punishes corrupt 
individuals and groups for a wide variety of offences, spearheaded by the Penal Code 
that introduced serious penalties against offenders. It deals in considerable detail with 
a wide variety of corrupt acts such as bribery, fraud, embezzlement of public funds, 
and illegal acceptance of gifts and has introduced imprisonment (between two to 
twelve years) and substantial fines (MAPI 2015).
The Penal Code is supplemented by the Anti-corruption Law, which states that for the 
first time a corporate entity or its agents could be jailed for corruption. It is an extreme-
ly tough law with less than satisfactory enforcement especially in the spheres of supply 
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chain management, individual or collusion-based fraud, and bribery. Such realities are 
exacerbated by the corruption of sections of the judiciary with many reported acts of 
bribery, influenced by business and political interests, bureaucracy, patronage and lack 
of independence (Business Anti-corruption Portal n.d).
The key anti-corruption agencies in the country are the Public Prosecutor s´ Office (MPF), 
the Federal Police Department (DPF), National Court of Accounts (TCU), and Office of 
the Comptroller General (CGU), from which the Public Prosecutor s´ Office is considered 
independent and autonomous, as no other anti-corruption body can perform its duties. It 
has its own budget and is treated and perceived as the key institution fighting corruption.
The Federal Police Department’s main objectives are diverse as it deals with all types 
of corruption related to the public sectors, as well as smuggling, drug traffic, terrorism 
and environmental crimes. It is also involved in border and sea patrolling (Prado and 
Carson 2016:35–36).
The revitalisation of the police following the Lula Presidency was assisted by the estab-
lishment of the Office of the Comptroller General and this synergy led to a significant 
number of successes in the fight against criminal syndicates as well as bribery, collu-
sion, and embezzlement in the public sector that ended up in the Court of Accounts. 
These successes, however, were not enough to stop corruption.
The Court of Accounts is the country’s legislative watchdog that performs performance 
audits of a financial and budgetary nature, including assets allocation and government 
expenditures in terms of service delivery and accomplishments. It is an “external control” 
mechanism at federal level (Power, and Taylor 2011:2–3). The Office of the Comptroller 
General is the Brazilian internal control of the political executive, established by President 
Lula in 2003, supplemented by the Secretariat of Prevention of Corruption and Strategic 
Information, and dealing especially with internal Control; a disciplinary board; corruption 
prevention and transparency and the appointment of a Federal Ombudsman. The office 
has been instrumental in monitoring and evaluating legal and regulatory priorities associ-
ated with the efficiency of all government programmes nationally, and identifying irregu-
larities and corrupt practices in all their variations. These actions end at the Disciplinary 
Board, which deals with corruption of public servants at all government layers in following 
a set of disciplinary measures. It is considered successful as its actions have led to the firing 
of over 4 000 public servants at all levels since 2003 (De Figueiredo 2015:2–3). Nothing of 
that sort can be found in the history of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa.
The Special Operations Division is a ‘behind the scenes’ division of the Internal Control 
Secretariat overseeing the operational actions of the Police and the Public Prosecutors, 
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which is in turn connected to the Observatory of Public Spending a secretive unit col-
lecting information on corruption in public organisations . It is operative in information 
collection and storage and another section deals with detection, analysis and report-
ing. The multiple system has been supplemented by the Secretariat for Transparency 
and Prevention of Corruption that is involved in maintaining social control and trans-
parency, and mainly concentrates on the international terrain and anti-corruption laws. 
The anti-corruption ‘supplementary anti-corruption agencies’ include the National 
Intelligence, the Federal Revenue Secretariat , the Financial Control Office, and the 
Central Bank (Prado et al. 2016:7–8).
Despite these efforts, there has been strong evidence that known grand corruption po-
litical scandals, the fraud and bribery in public procurement for example, has increased 
significantly through a continuous reporting of bribes, fraud and irregular payments to 
a number of firms with close political connections. One of the best known has been 
the ‘Operation Car Wash’ debacle involving Petrobras that led to the impeachment 
of ex-President Rousseff. It cost the Brazilian citizens over USD 5.3 billion (Vox 2016; 
The Guardian 2017a; Bogdan 2015). The scandals related to the 2016 Olympics are 
also investigated as are a large number of public health officials in the meat-exporting 
scandal that cost Brazil’s USD 12 billion meat-exporting industry, which has recently 
been uncovered (Reuters, 2017). Over130 deputies and senators were bribed by a 
meat processing conglomerate (The Guardian 2017b).
There has been serious and comprehensive criticism of the anti-corruption agencies 
in Brazil despite their success against a number of senior politicians and a variety of 
public servants. These critics pinpoint the existence of a corruption gap leading to the 
reality of serious lack of punishment at all levels for effective punishment of corruption 
acts in the country that allow for perpetration of it (Praça and Taylor 2014:34–35). It 
was mentioned earlier that there have been successes of the agencies precisely be-
cause of joint operations of a combination of the agencies such as Public Prosecutors, 
the Police and the Office of the Comptroller General, but the reality is that the coor-
dination and synergy of the agencies is really lacking and inadequate (Zaheer 2014).
The reason for this is that there is no actual coordination, cooperation, and synergy, as 
the operational methods take different forms, which leads to continuous competition, 
repetition, and lack of interaction at a number of levels. There is also evidence of infor-
mation sharing as well as adequate utilisation of human capital at their disposal (Speck 
2011). These deficiencies lead to a non-satisfactory outcome in the final analysis. From 
a structural point of view, the truth is that the number of agencies is large with few 
really having dedicated, ‘exclusive’ duties and responsibilities, meaning that the state 
budget increases substantially and confuses the citizens on the exact nature of duties 
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and responsibilities of structures and people (Lehmann 2015). The final result is that 
intelligence gathering is compromised, as are secrecy and operational independence. 
The lack of information sharing exacerbates the problems.
It has led to the primary role of the Office of the Comptroller General in the fight 
against corruption, assisted by the Internal Control Secretariat, a reason that has in 
turn led to serious budget cut that has compromised its independence and autonomy 
(MAPI 2015). The defective information sharing and confidentiality among agencies 
has led to the introduction of the Corruption Combat and Money Laundering National 
Strategy, which was hoped to be an additional player in the fight against corruption via 
an integration of planning and ultimately implementing an integrated and collaborative 
approach through information sharing analyses and debates regarding new, innova-
tive legislation (Taylor 2009:155–156). Despite the efforts, there has been no success. 
Implementation was unsuccessful, few bills were passed and coordination and synergy 
have been visibly compromised.
The weakness of Information Technology systems in the agencies compromises data 
mining and data crossing as well as analysis and investigation imperatives related to 
risk management. These realities lead to the assessment that field operations in terms 
of external activities suffer the consequences (Taylor and Buranelli, 2007:58–59). 
Continuous and high-level professional training programs have never been the priority 
of the state political and administrative leadership, with the result that human capital 
lacks in advanced skills (De Figueiredo, 2015:3). While the laws exist together with an 
abundance of anti-corruption agencies, the present methods, plans, technology and 
knowledge are dispersed and poorly connected, thus facing serious limitations.
It is not an island of hope.
CONCLUSION
It needs to be said that in the two case studies presented for anticorruption agen-
cies to be successful there are a number of premises. In both cases, the existing 
legislative and regulatory frameworks point to the fact that the overall performance 
in the fight against corruption should be better. However, political interference, lack 
of capacity, and the non-existence of coordination, synergy and cooperation are 
serious impediments.
This provides impetus to corruption at all societal levels, with serious repercussions for 
the most vulnerable sections of the respective populations. There is a lack of political 
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will that has a negative impact on the very independence of such institutions despite 
the existence of legal and regulatory foundations. These have been challenged in both 
cases by organs of civil society and the citizens of the two countries. Because of these 
realities, there is a lack of a coordinated effort in detecting, preventing, analysing and 
prosecuting corrupt individuals, groups, institutions and businesses.
The lack of synergy, coordination and cooperation in both cases is founded on the 
reality that there is the absence of a single coordinating body that plans, designs and 
implements the strategic and tactical imperatives in the fight against corruption. This 
reality, and despite the fact that policy in both cases guarantees independence, the ex-
istence of political and/or administrative interference is a major obstacle. Operational 
weaknesses, and inside corruption by the leadership and rank and file, dent perfor-
mance and resources, and are serious impediments in the fight against corruption. As a 
result, integrated planning is absent.
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